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Responsibility and the Problem of So-Called Marginal Agents 
 
Abstract:  
Philosophical views of responsibility often identify responsible agency with capacities like 
rationality and self-control. Yet in ordinary life, we frequently hold individuals responsible who are 
deficient in these capacities, such as children or people with mental illness. The existing literature 
that addresses these cases has suggested that we merely pretend to hold these agents responsible, or 
that they are responsible to a diminished degree. In this paper, I demonstrate that neither of these 
approaches is satisfactory, and offer an alternative focused on the role relationships play in 
determining whether it is appropriate to hold someone responsible. I argue that relationships are 
sources of normative expectations about how parties in that relationship ought to behave, and that 
we can be responsible in virtue of being subject to these norms. This is so, not only for those who 
are impaired or immature, but for all of us.  
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1. Introduction 
Much of the existing philosophical literature about responsibility begins by asking what it 
takes for an agent to be responsible. This line of inquiry then frequently proceeds by considering 
what capacities might distinguish paradigm responsible agents (i.e., psychologically normal adult 
human beings) from lower animals, inanimate objects, and human beings who are not responsible 
agents par excellence. Possible candidates for such capacities include rationality, self-control, and the 
capacity to deliberate before acting.  
In addition to the interest philosophers have had in giving accounts of the capacities that 
underwrite responsible agency, there has been increasing interest in our social practices of holding 
people responsible. There has not been sufficient investigation, however, of how those practices 
involve agents who are impaired or immature, and therefore deficient in the capacities typically 
regarded as necessary for being responsible.1 Yet in ordinary life, we hold individuals who are 
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deficient in these capacities responsible all the time; this is a vital part of, for example, parenting and 
psychotherapy. Careful attention to these undertheorized contexts shows us that to be responsible 
for anything is always to be responsible to someone for something, or so I will argue here.  
2. The Contours of Our Practice 
In this paper, I will consider a range of cases of holding people responsible that has been 
underexplored in the existing literature: cases involving so-called “marginal agents” such as young 
children, people with cognitive disabilities, and people with psychiatric disorders.2 What I will say 
about these cases leaves open the question of just how responsible these agents are according to 
theories that identify responsibility with the rational and volitional capacities described above. My 
discussion is motivated instead by the observation that in some important ways, these individuals are 
undoubtedly participants in at least some of our responsibility practices. A parent who chose not to 
hold his daughter responsible for anything merely because she was a child, for example, would be 
misguided at best; this would be similarly true of a therapist who chose not to hold her patients 
                                                        
 
1 There is a substantial literature on the question of whether an agent’s being responsible is 
metaphysically more basic than her being held responsible. For a range of views on this topic, see 
Brink and Nelkin (2013), Smith (2007), Wallace (1994), Watson (2004), Shoemaker (2017) and 
McKenna (2012). This priority question is independent of what I am claiming here: that is, that 
holding impaired or immature agents (i.e., “marginal agents”) responsible is a legitimate and 
commonplace part of our responsibility practices that remains undertheorized. Moreover, I contend 
that correctly describing this practice has important consequences for what it means not only to 
hold someone responsible, but to be responsible in our social world. I share Strawson’s 
methodological commitment to seeing the social practices of responsibility as fundamental, and 
theories of responsibility as beholden to those practices. I also share his wariness of over-
intellectualizing our discussions of responsibility, and thinking that any claim about the nature of 
responsibility must be understood in metaphysical terms.  
 
2 I would prefer not to use the term “marginal agents” because I view it as an underestimation of the 
agents in question, but I use it in response to the existing literature on the subject by David 
Shoemaker and others. 
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responsible for coming to the majority of their sessions as scheduled because they have psychiatric 
difficulties.  
That said, responsibility responses to these individuals, should they fail to meet their 
responsibilities, typically are and should be modified in accordance with the individuals’ deficits: we 
do not feel resentment towards a young child who blurts out the first thing on her mind, and we are 
often unclear how to respond when an addict struggles to maintain his sobriety, even when we 
would resent or blame others who behave similarly. Both the inclusion of marginal agents in some 
of our responsibility practices and the fact that our responses to them are modified stand in need of 
explanation. 
Marginal agents are identified as such in virtue of the deficits they may have in the capacities 
typically associated with responsible agency. As such, the category is extremely broad; it includes 
individuals as different from each other as four-year-olds, adults with cognitive disabilities, and 
addicts. Nonetheless, our responsibility responses to marginal agents share some common features, 
as I will illustrate below.3  
Sunday Brunch 
You are at a restaurant on the weekend, and your five-year-old child is yelling at the top of 
his lungs. The restaurant is packed and your son is screaming because he is bored. At this point, 
many people in the restaurant probably hold you responsible for your son’s screaming; his behavior 
                                                        
3 Although these examples are hypothetical, I take them to reflect perfectly ordinary circumstances 
one might find oneself in during the course of one’s life. I also take them to be representative of the 
most central aspects of our practices of holding marginal agents responsible, but this claim requires a 
caveat: Much of the philosophical literature about marginal agency focuses on psychopaths, and it is 
unclear to me that the account I give of holding marginal agents responsible would apply in any neat 
way to psychopaths. Those cases ought to be treated differently, however, because of the nature of 
psychopaths’ impairments with respect to empathy and interpersonal engagement, and the 
limitations those specific impairments may place on psychopaths participating in the moral 
community, even in an attenuated sense.  
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is obnoxious, and others would appreciate it if you could get him to calm down and be quiet. The 
host, for example, might wish that both of you would go outside. It also seems appropriate for you 
to hold your son responsible for his behavior. You might do this by telling him he needs to stop 
yelling and mentioning the use of “inside voices,” or by telling him that if he behaves himself, you’ll 
be leaving soon. Though these responses are different from the ways you would hold an adult 
responsible for similar conduct, you are certainly responding to your child’s behavior by reminding 
him of expectations that he is not living up to, and the hope is that this reminder will motivate him 
to behave better. Also, though you might expect your child not to scream just because he is bored, 
you might not similarly expect him to abstain from screaming if he burns his tongue on hot soup, as 
you presumably would with most adults. 
 Noon Somewhere #1 
An alcoholic agrees to meet an acquaintance from work for coffee at 8am. When they greet 
each other, the alcoholic seems to be acting strangely, saying odd things at full volume. The 
acquaintance then realizes that he smells alcohol on his colleague’s breath and is unsure how to 
respond. On the one hand, the acquaintance may reasonably be annoyed or concerned by his 
colleague’s behavior, but on the other, he might wonder what to say (given that being intoxicated 
that early in the morning makes him suspect that his colleague is an alcoholic, and he doesn’t know 
his colleague well). It seems appropriate for him to withhold angry or judgmental responses he 
might have been inclined to have before realizing his colleague was drunk so early in the day.  
Noon Somewhere #2 
Now imagine the same individual struggling with alcoholism who arrives similarly 
intoxicated to his 8am therapy appointment. It seems much more appropriate for his therapist to call 
him out, and insist on the importance of being sober for their appointments. In fact, a therapist who 
ignored this concern would strike us as negligent. 
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While these cases involve many considerations having to do with responsibility, I will focus 
on some that are especially salient. In Sunday Brunch, there are very different expectations for how 
the parent and the host of the restaurant ought to conduct themselves, though both might have 
reason to be frustrated at the child’s screaming. Similarly, both the acquaintance and the therapist of 
the alcoholic in Noon Somewhere may be concerned and irritated by the alcoholic’s inebriated state, 
but there is nonetheless a contrast in how it is appropriate for them to respond.  
Moreover, the reason why the restaurant host and the acquaintance might rightly bite their 
tongues in these circumstances is that it is arguably not their place to hold the child or the alcoholic 
responsible, who is more or less a stranger to them. (While the host might appropriately hold the 
parent responsible for how she handles her son’s screaming, that is a separate matter.) The host of 
the restaurant would probably respond quite differently to a (presumed psychologically normal) 
adult who had a similar outburst in the restaurant, as would the acquaintance to a colleague who 
neglected social obligations with no apparent mitigating circumstances. Finally, the ways in which 
the parent and the therapist hold those in their care responsible is sensitive to their capacities; the 
parent’s responses in Sunday Brunch, for example, reflect both her frustration at her son’s behavior 
and her knowledge that it is difficult for him to control how he expresses his emotions at this age. 
While she may disapprove of his behavior and express this to him, the tone of her disapproval and 
its expression are colored by her knowledge that he is young and it would be challenging for him to 
behave himself in the circumstances.  
In summary, these cases bring out three central features of our practices of holding 
responsible as they involve marginal agents: 
1. The norms to which one holds marginal agents responsible may (though need not) have 
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different content than those that psychologically normal adults are expected to uphold.4  
2. The ways in which it is appropriate to hold marginal agents responsible may (though 
need not) have a different character or tone than the ways one ought to hold 
psychologically normal adults responsible. 
3. It matters significantly what one’s relationship is to a given marginal agent whether or 
not one should hold her responsible. 
Another important thing these cases are meant to illustrate is that holding someone responsible 
should not be understood as synonymous with blaming her or seeing her as a fitting object of the 
negative reactive attitudes (e.g., resentment). As I understand it, holding someone responsible means 
holding her to an expectation – that is, enforcing a norm. One might do this by blaming or 
punishing, but also by praising, crediting, demanding an apology, or reminding someone what we 
expect of them going forward. 
3. Possible Explanations 
Below, I will consider some accounts of why we hold marginal agents responsible in the 
particular ways that we do (that is, why 1, 2, and 3 above are true). To state the explananda explicitly, 
we need to account for the fact that we include marginal agents in some of our responsibility 
practices at all, despite judging that they are deficient in the capacities typically associated with 
responsible agency, and we must also account for the three features above that describe the 
                                                        
4 Though I will go on to argue that all four of the candidate explanations I consider for how we hold 
marginal agents responsible can explain this feature, it is not entirely uncontroversial. Scanlon, for 
instance, writes, “We do not blame young children for things such as rudeness or self-centeredness 
in the same way that we would blame an adult. This is not because the relevant standards of conduct 
are different for children. We would not say to a child, ‘It is all right to hit people now, since you are 
a child, but don’t do it later when you are grown up’” (Scanlon 2008: 156). But in Sunday Brunch, it 
seems plausible that the child might be responsible for not screaming because he’s bored, though 
not responsible for not screaming after burning his tongue, though ordinarily we would regard 
adults as responsible for not screaming in either case. Arguably, then, some of the relevant standards 
of conduct are different for children, which is all I am claiming. 
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character of that holding responsible. Before arguing for my own view, which is that we hold 
marginal agents responsible largely in virtue of norms that arise in the context of certain kinds of 
relationships, I will consider three alternatives: the pretense view, the degrees of responsibility view, 
and Shoemaker’s tripartite view of responsibility. Ultimately, I will argue that these other 
explanations are inadequate, primarily because they do not explain the third feature — that is, they 
fail to account for the vital role that our relationships to marginal agents play in our practices of 
holding them responsible. 
3a. The pretense view 
According to the pretense view, we include marginal agents in our responsibility practices 
only in a derivative sense. The account is roughly the following: some individuals who are in close 
relationships with marginal agents (especially their caregivers) have to teach them how to behave and 
how to take responsibility for their behavior, and the most effective way to do this is by holding 
them responsible. That said, parents of young children, for example, are well aware that their 
children are not really responsible, and this knowledge undermines the possibility that holding them 
responsible could be entirely genuine. When we hold psychologically normal adults responsible, we 
do so in virtue of believing that they display a level of normative and agential competence that 
marginal agents don’t have, but we can pretend marginal agents have this competence for the sake 
of helping them to develop the relevant capacities and learn moral norms. Any justification for our 
practices of holding marginal agents responsible on the pretense view comes from the instrumental 
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role those practices play in helping to integrate marginal agents into the moral community, and 
teaching them how to behave properly.5, 6  
There is a kernel of truth in the pretense view, namely that holding marginal agents 
responsible is often an important part of moral education, and as such is frequently predicated on 
the aspirations those in close relationships with marginal agents have for their growth and 
development. But the motivation for endorsing the pretense view comes from a theoretical 
commitment I am questioning, namely that genuinely holding someone responsible is only justifiable 
if one believes that they possess a relatively high degree of normative and agential competence. 
Although this commitment is a part of much of the philosophical literature on responsibility, it has 
substantial costs. 
                                                        
5 For one statement of this view, see Vargas’ Building Better Beings. Vargas claims that though 
“...young children might well be responsible agents in very specific or local circumstances…it seems 
fair to characterize a good deal of parenting and acculturation as bent to the task of expanding the 
range of circumstances in which the targets have the capacities required for moral responsibility. 
Initially, much of this happens via feigned attributions of responsibility. In contrast to genuinely 
holding someone responsible, moral education is typically undertaken in the way characterized by 
traditional moral influence theorists, that is, with the aspiration of influencing. There is no 
assumption that the target is a responsible agent. Indeed, the point of feigning praise and blame just 
is to get children to such a point where they have the capacities that are required for genuine praise 
and blame. In contrast, holding someone morally responsible assumes the relevant capacities are 
present and that the agent has failed to demonstrate the appropriate form of moral concern.” 
(Vargas 2013: 229). 
6 See also Wallace’s (1994) discussion of children’s responsibility in Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments. He writes, “Because children lack…[the powers of reflective self-control]…or are still in 
the process of acquiring them, it would be unreasonable to hold them fully accountable with respect 
to the moral obligations we accept. But of course we often treat them as if they were accountable 
agents when they violate those obligations…[P]artly it is because treating children as if they were 
responsible is believed to be the most effective way to stimulate the development of their powers of 
reflective self-control” (Wallace 1994: 167, emphasis in original). Wallace’s complete view on 
holding children responsible, however, is actually a hybrid of the pretense view and the degrees of 
responsibility view below. Darwall also offers a similar account of holding children responsible in his 
discussion of ‘non-central cases’ in The Second Person Standpoint (Darwall 2006: 86-8). 
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Holding marginal agents responsible is an essential part of many relationships those agents 
have, and in those contexts, it doesn’t seem like just a noble lie. In other words, when parents hold 
their children responsible, most conceive of themselves as doing so genuinely and not merely with 
an eye toward behavior modification. An analogous point seems to hold in therapeutic relationships, 
where therapists hold their patients responsible in a way that ideally reflects their respect for their 
patients’ agency as well as the desire for them to avoid self-destructive behavior. It is important to 
respect the phenomenology of those relationships, where recognition of a marginal agent’s 
limitations doesn’t preclude authentically holding her responsible, though it may require modifying 
some of our ordinary responsibility responses. If we are not forced to describe those practices as a 
kind of pretense whose justification is merely instrumental, we should avoid doing so. 
3b. The degrees of responsibility view 
The pretense view also offers no substantive explanation for the three aforementioned 
features of our practices of holding marginal agents responsible, though it is compatible with them. 
There are alternative views, however, that do have more to say by way of explanation of those 
features. One straightforward way to understand how we might hold marginal agents responsible 
despite their being deficient in the capacities typically associated with responsible agency is to say 
that there are degrees of responsibility. We hold marginal agents responsible because they are 
responsible, but to a lesser degree than psychologically normal adults.7 At first glance, this view 
seems quite plausible: many of the conditions that make someone count as a marginal agent, 
including childhood and many psychiatric difficulties, are experienced temporarily.  Outgrowing or 
                                                        
7 Coates and Swenson (2013), who are proponents of one version of this view, explain degrees of 
responsibility in terms of degrees of reasons-responsiveness. Tiboris (2014) develops a similar view 
about children in particular according to which they are less responsible because they have 
diminished normative competence. There could well be other views in the same family that focus on 
other capacities that are regarded as both necessary for responsible agency and that admit of degrees.  
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overcoming such conditions plausibly includes growth in the capacities associated with responsible 
agency.  
Moreover, facilitating such growth may require holding those agents responsible while 
acknowledging that their capacities for self-control or rational deliberation may be limited. As 
Strawson writes,  
"Parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing of young children...are dealing 
with creatures who are potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being 
objects of, the full range of human and moral attitudes, but are not yet truly capable of 
either. The treatment of such creatures must therefore represent a kind of compromise, 
constantly shifting in one direction, between objectivity of attitude and developed human 
attitudes. Rehearsals insensibly modulate toward true performances” (Strawson 2008: 20). 
 
This point of Strawson’s is related to the first two features I described as central to our practices of 
holding marginal agents responsible: the restricted scope of the normative demands we can 
appropriately place on these agents (in this case, children), and the ways in which enforcing those 
demands is colored by knowledge of the agent’s present limitations and her potential to overcome 
them. The compromise Strawson mentions is reflected in the fact that marginal agents participate in 
some of our responsibility practices, but our responses to them are modified in light of their deficits.  
The degrees of responsibility view, if true, would explain why the normative expectations 
that are properly placed on marginal agents may be less demanding, and may be enforced in 
different ways, namely because this reflects an understanding of marginal agents’ limitations. A 
therapist might believe that her patient ought to quit drinking entirely, for example, but knows this is 
a tall order. In light of that, she might set smaller, more manageable goals for his alcohol use (e.g., 
that he cut back to a certain amount and disclose how much he is drinking to her), and enforce these 
goals without the use of anger and resentment that are common parts of interpersonal blame with 
psychologically normal adults. What the cases I’ve described invite us to see, however, is that 
introducing the notion of degrees of responsibility is not sufficient to understand our responsibility 
responses to marginal agents. In particular, it does not capture the differences between the ways 
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those in close relationships with marginal agents are entitled to hold them responsible in comparison 
with mere strangers or acquaintances.  
If all that was going on in Sunday Brunch, for example, was that a young child is less 
responsible and should therefore be held less responsible for his screaming than a psychologically 
normal adult, then it would be just as appropriate for the host of the restaurant to hold the child 
responsible as for the parent to do so. But this is false; I take it that most parents would respond to 
the host holding the child responsible by saying that the host is out of line, and many parents would 
accept responsibility for the child’s screaming even if they did nothing to cause it. The parent-child 
relationship seems to play an essential role in understanding this case, and the degrees of 
responsibility view cannot account for this on its own. A similar, though less striking, contrast holds 
between the acquaintance and the therapist in Noon Somewhere #1 and #2. 
 3c. Shoemaker’s tripartite view of responsibility 
 In his recent book, Responsibility from the Margins, David Shoemaker develops a view of 
responsibility that tries to account for much of the complexity involved in holding a wide range of 
marginal agents responsible. Unlike the degrees of responsibility view, Shoemaker doesn’t 
characterize the deficits of marginal agents in terms of their being at a different point on a unified 
responsibility scale from psychologically normal adults. Instead, he characterizes our primary attitude 
about holding marginal agents responsible as ambivalence – not because we’re uncertain about 
whether or not they are responsible, or just how responsible they are, but rather because, “[t]hese are 
agents who often strike us as ineligible only for some subset of responsibility responses while 
nevertheless being fully eligible for others” (Shoemaker 2015: viii). 
Following Strawson, Shoemaker views responsibility as being essentially connected to the 
reactive attitudes (e.g., gratitude, resentment, and indignation) and thereby to the quality of an 
agent’s will. As Strawson writes, “The reactive attitudes…are essentially reactions to the quality of 
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others’ wills towards us, as manifested in their behavior: to their good or ill will or indifference or 
lack of concern” (Strawson 2008: 15). For example, I might feel resentment towards someone who 
intentionally pushes past me in line because he is displaying disregard towards me (as well as others 
in the line), and expressing this resentment would be one way of holding him responsible.  
Shoemaker locates the source of our ambivalence about holding marginal agents responsible in the 
claim that ‘quality of will’ is ambiguous between three senses that can come apart.8 As such, he 
claims that we need to understand responsibility as admitting of three corresponding senses: 
attributability, accountability, and answerability. We are ambivalent in the sense Shoemaker describes 
because marginal agents are responsible in some of these senses but not all (Shoemaker 2015: viii). 
 To his credit, Shoemaker spends considerable effort attending to the empirical details of 
different conditions that afflict marginal agents and the consequences of those details for his 
account of responsibility. His account is thus capable of providing a fine-grained analysis of why the 
norms to which we hold specific marginal agents responsible might have different content and 
conditions of enforcement (i.e., the first two features I referred to above). But Shoemaker offers no 
real explanation for the third feature, namely why one’s relationship to a given marginal agent should 
matter so profoundly in determining whether or not one is entitled to hold her responsible.9 In fact, 
                                                        
8 Shoemaker calls these three senses “quality of character, quality of judgment, and quality of regard” 
(Shoemaker 2015: viii). They define quality of will in terms of one’s character traits, one’s capacity 
for judgment and rational self-governance, and the regard or concern one has for others, 
respectively (Shoemaker 2015: 10-13). Though these details are important for having a full 
understanding of Shoemaker’s view, they are not relevant for my purposes.  
 
9 More recently, Shoemaker (2017) has defended a response-dependent view of responsibility. His 
discussion of this view focuses on blameworthiness and its connections to anger. He characterizes 
this view as follows: “The blameworthy (in the realm of accountability) just is whatever merits anger 
(the anger-worthy); that is, someone is blameworthy (and so accountable) for X if and only if, and in 
virtue of the fact that, she merits anger for X” (Shoemaker 2017: 508). The sense of meriting in 
question for Shoemaker is to be understood in terms of D’Arms and Jacobson’s (2000) “fittingness” 
framework. Though this is a view on which holding responsible is metaphysically prior to being 
responsible, Shoemaker nonetheless seems to think that the targets of our responsibility responses 
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he seems committed to locating the differences between how we hold marginal agents responsible 
and how we hold psychologically normal adults responsible in capacities internal to these agents 
rather than in their interpersonal relationships.10  
Interestingly, Shoemaker notes that with at least some kinds of marginal agents, those in 
close relationships to those agents have fairly robust responsibility responses while others do not. As 
he writes, “...with their caregivers, friends, and family, adults with mild intellectual disabilities (MID) 
are quite often treated as full-fledged moral agents (at least with respect to a subset of moral 
demands), susceptible to full-throated reactive emotions and other responsibility responses” 
(Shoemaker 2015: 31). Moreover, these responsibility responses on the part of caregivers and loved 
ones seem to achieve uptake. As Shoemaker writes, “Adults with MID seem generally able to 
understand the emotional communications of agential anger and gratitude as such, see and 
appreciate the distress associated with injuries and harms to others as reasons of the right sort, and 
feel what the injured or harmed party feels in being so affected” (Shoemaker 2015: 185).  
 “…[S]trangers (who are aware of…[their conditions]…) but who are not in…[close] 
relationships…with those with MID,” however, “may think that [individuals with such disabilities] 
                                                        
are agential capacities of individual agents. As he writes, “…[D]ifferent responsibility emotions 
could target very different agential capacities, which could well mean that they implicate different 
types of responsibility” (Shoemaker 2017: 521). If he is committed to his response-dependent 
methodology in a thoroughgoing way and grew to be sympathetic to the thought that our 
relationships play an irreducible role in making certain types of responsibility responses fitting or 
unfitting, then his view would be compatible with mine. But this would be quite a substantial 
departure from his extended (2015) treatment of responsibility and marginal agency, and does not 
seem to be something he has in mind even in the (2017) paper. 
10 He also gives the following schematic way of characterizing how responsibility attributions are to 
be understood: “To be a responsible agent is to be worthy of X for Y in virtue of Z, where X refers 
to some kind of “praising” and “blaming” responsibility responses, Y refers to something like 
actions or attitudes, and Z refers to the responsibility-maker, be it, for example, one’s capacity for 
reasons-responsiveness, one’s capacity for having and expressing one’s deep self, or, as Strawson 
would have it, one’s capacity for having a quality of will” (Shoemaker 2015: 17). Notice that all of 
the candidate responsibility-making capacities Shoemaker proposes are internal in the way I’ve 
described. 
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may not be able to recognize them as a fellow member of the accountability community…” and are 
therefore reluctant to hold them accountable (Shoemaker 2015: 187). Shoemaker writes that, “...such 
reluctance may be appropriate. Because of their developmental impairments, adults with MID may 
indeed have difficulty...accessing or appreciating abstract principles about mutual recognition and 
accountability amongst all members of the accountability community” (Shoemaker 2015: 187). In 
other words, while people with MID experience empathy and other moral emotions when observing 
someone in distress, for example, they may have difficulty understanding practical demands, 
expectations, or criticism placed on them by strangers. In contrast, they may well understand robust 
responsibility responses on the part of caregivers and others with whom they are in close 
relationships, and presumably those relationships themselves play an important role in securing that 
understanding.  
Shoemaker accounts for how a caregiver’s, friend’s, or relative’s relationship to an individual 
with MID can inform her appropriately holding that individual responsible by focusing on how that 
relationship facilitates the person with MID’s understanding of the relevant practical demands. It 
may be true that people with MID better understand practical demands given by their caregivers and 
loved ones, and this may partially explain why these relationships are typically the only ones that 
involve “full-throated” responsibility responses. But Shoemaker still holds that the sense in which 
individuals with MID are responsible is solely a function of capacities internal to them, and therefore 
makes their relationships incidental to their responsibility. Moreover, this kind of account about the 
role of relationships in our responsibility practices doesn’t generalize to the full range of marginal 
agents.11 For example, it doesn’t seem to be a lack of understanding of social norms that keeps the 
                                                        
11 There are important differences among the conditions that make individuals count as marginal 
agents, so being unable to provide a general account of how relationships affect responsibility 
responses to these agents is not a decisive objection to Shoemaker’s view. I mean only to put 
pressure on the idea that the best way to understand why those close to individuals with MID have 
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alcoholic from arriving at his appointments sober, and he would understand his acquaintance and 
his therapist holding him responsible equally well. What seems to be at issue here is not only the 
relevant responsibility responses being intelligible because of the relationship between the agents in 
question, but those responses being appropriate given the nature of that relationship. 
3d. The relationship-based norms view 
 While there are important differences between the three views I’ve considered above, they all 
locate the differences between how we hold marginal agents responsible and how we hold 
psychologically normal adults responsible solely in capacities internal to those agents. But this 
distorts the phenomena of interest. We cannot understand our practices of holding marginal agents 
responsible without recognizing that our relationships to these agents have a fundamental role to 
play in those practices. 
i. The limits of standing 
There have been some attempts in the philosophical literature to capture how our 
relationships to a person or their actions impact how we especially should respond to them in light 
of what they have done. One central notion in this literature is ‘standing to blame.’ The thought 
behind this notion is that whether a blameworthy individual should in fact be blamed depends not 
only on whether or not they are responsible for doing something bad but also on whether anyone 
bears the appropriate kind of relationship to the person’s actions such that they can rightly issue 
blame (i.e., has standing to blame).12 On a standard view of this notion, agents must meet the 
                                                        
“full-throated” responsibility responses to them while others refrain from doing so is solely in terms 
of those individuals’ capacity to understand their respective practical demands.  
 
12 There are many conceptions of blame and what it requires. The differences among these views are 
substantial, but they are not the central focus of this paper, and what I say about the notion of 
standing is neutral between them. In particular, my claim that the host of the restaurant has standing 
to blame the child, though it is nonetheless inappropriate for her to do so, does not depend on 
thinking that blame must be expressed publicly.  
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following conditions in order to have standing to blame:  
1. They must have an identifiable stake in the wrongdoing in question (i.e., it must be their 
business). 
2. They must be contemporaries (i.e., part of the same moral community) as the potential 
target of blame. 
3. They must not have engaged in similar wrongdoing in the past such that their blame 
would be hypocritical. 
4. They must not be responsible for or complicit in the wrongdoing. 
If all of the potential blamers for a wrongful action fail to meet these conditions, then those 
who endorse the notion of standing would claim that blame is inappropriate even though the 
individual who performed the action is blameworthy (Bell 2013: 264). 
The notion of standing is not particularly illuminating for understanding how our 
relationships matter to our responsibility responses to marginal agents. Invoking standing does 
introduce some relational considerations with respect to the appropriateness of blame – specifically, 
that the blamer and target of blame must be contemporaries, and the blamer must avoid hypocrisy, 
complicity, and nosiness in relation to that particular action. But these conditions entail little if 
anything about the nature of the relationship between the blamer and target of blame, which seems 
to be a vital part of an adequate description of the cases at hand.13 For example, on the standard 
conception of standing, it looks as though the host at the restaurant would have standing to blame 
                                                        
 
13 One might think that whether a particular wrongful action is one’s business is a reflection of the 
relationship between the potential blamer and target of blame, but this need not be so. For example, 
the child’s screaming is the business of the restaurant staff because it is their job to accommodate 
other customers, not because of any relationship between the staff and the child. Nonetheless, we 
would typically regard it as inappropriate for the restaurant staff to hold the child responsible. 
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the five-year-old screaming in her restaurant, though it nonetheless seems inappropriate for her to 
do so.  
ii. Relationships as sources of norms  
The key to understanding how relationships inform our responsibility responses to marginal 
agents is to view close relationships as sources of some of the norms we expect these agents to 
uphold. The reason why the parent but not the host in Sunday Brunch is entitled to hold her child 
responsible is that she has established expectations with her son for his behavior, where there are 
consequences for violating those expectations. While there might be general expectations that 
people behave respectfully and considerately in public spaces, the child in this example would not 
generally be viewed as responsible for upholding them yet, which explains the apparent 
inappropriateness of his being held responsible by the restaurant staff or other strangers. Until he is 
able to appreciate and uphold those general expectations, he is only responsible for upholding 
relationship-based norms in this domain.14 This is not to say that children, or marginal agents more 
generally, are only subject to relationship-based norms. Rather, in domains where they are impaired 
or immature, some general norms may be offline, though they may be subject to relationship-based 
norms with overlapping (though perhaps less demanding) content. 
When parents hold their children responsible, this often serves an educative function.15 More 
                                                        
14 The term ‘relationship-based norms’ is derived from ‘relationship-dependent norms,’ which was 
introduced by Macalester Bell in “The Standing to Blame: A Critique” in order to explain how 
“blame’s moral propriety sometimes depends on the relationship between the blamer and the target 
[of blame]” without invoking the notion of standing, which she finds problematic (Bell 2013: 265). 
In the development of this notion, I am strongly indebted to her. 
 
15 Saying that our responsibility responses to children serve an educative function does not preclude 
them from being genuine instances of holding responsible. Though moral education is an important 
part of childrearing, it is not as though our moral education stops once we become adults. Holding 
anyone responsible, regardless of their maturity, can be a way of drawing their attention to important 
considerations they may be unaware of or have otherwise overlooked. This point is of a piece with 
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specifically, it is a way of modeling important aspects of the norms of the wider moral community, 
both in terms of their content and what happens when they are violated. This allows children to 
learn what constitutes making a moral mistake, and the consequences that particular mistake would 
have for their interpersonal relationships. But it also insulates children from overly harsh treatment 
while they are learning how they are supposed to behave, how to control themselves, and how their 
behavior affects others.  
An analogous point can be made about Noon Somewhere. The reason why the therapist 
should hold the alcoholic responsible for showing up intoxicated is that their relationship is partially 
constituted by certain expectations about how both parties ought to behave. Some of those 
expectations would be a part of all relationships that are genuinely therapeutic. For example, a 
therapist must have some hope that her patient can recover, and the patient must make a good faith 
effort to attain recovery (which would presumably include showing up to appointments sober). 
Other expectations that are part of therapeutic relationships will be more specific, and ideally, they 
will be established as a result of the patient’s desired aims for treatment and the therapist’s judgment 
about what is necessary and realistic in order for her to achieve those aims. In contrast, the 
relationship between the acquaintance and the alcoholic is currently fairly distant and unstructured, 
and consequently it is not a source of relationship-based norms in the same way.16 An attentive 
acquaintance might be bothered by his alcoholic colleague’s behavior at their meeting, but would 
also recognize that this same behavior indicates that something is seriously wrong with his colleague. 
                                                        
the view that blame paradigmatically serves a communicative function. For one statement of this 
view, see Fricker (2016). 
 
16 The point here is not that only a therapist could hold the alcoholic responsible for being sober at 
social engagements, but that relationship-based norms give relationships a certain structure, and 
therefore they tend to require a level of intimacy that is not had between strangers or acquaintances. 
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He should therefore, at the very least, hesitate about whether to hold his alcoholic colleague 
responsible, given this evidence of his impairment, and given that they are only acquaintances. By 
entering into therapy, however, the alcoholic has thereby created a relationship that is intended to be 
a source of norms about his drinking, and therefore his therapist can (and ordinarily should) hold 
him responsible for attending their appointments sober.17  
When therapists hold their patients responsible, this serves a number of important 
functions.18 For example, most patients know about the norms they are expected to uphold as a 
member of the moral community, but may be unsure whether or not they’re capable of living up to 
them; the role of the therapist is to facilitate growth in this latter arena, and thereby help those 
patients reintegrate into the community. Depending on the duration and severity of their illness, 
psychiatric patients may have strong inductive evidence that they can’t do what they must to avoid 
                                                        
17 A proponent of the notion of standing to blame might insist that a more proximate explanation 
here is that the alcoholic’s drinking is his therapist’s business, and not the acquaintance’s. But even if 
the alcoholic’s drinking is generally not the acquaintance’s business, his drunkenness at their meeting 
surely is, so this cannot explain the difference between the two cases.   
 
18 My views about the importance of holding responsible in therapeutic relationships share some 
commonalities with Pickard’s (2013) “responsibility without blame” framework. Pickard, however, 
claims that the sense in which people with mental disorders are responsible is non-moral because 
“behaviors like self-harm, substance abuse, and obsessive rituals, can be damaging to the person 
without necessarily damaging others” (Pickard 2013: 1150). Moreover, she claims that if therapists 
regarded their patients as morally at fault for their behavior, they would regard themselves as entitled 
to subject those patients to the negative reactive attitudes, which would undermine the effectiveness 
of their treatment. I am broadly sympathetic to Pickard’s view about how it is appropriate to hold 
patients responsible without subjecting them to negative reactive attitudes in the context of 
therapeutic relationships. I believe, however, that we can (and should) understand the significance of 
this without invoking a different, non-moral sense of responsibility. In some cases, it seems fitting to 
recognize that psychiatric patients are responsible for wrongful actions they perform but excuse 
them from the negative reactive attitudes because they do not deserve them given the nature of the 
difficulties that they face. And one might think that therapists are obliged to exhibit a degree of 
emotional detachment towards their patients that is incompatible with the negative reactive attitudes. 
Thus, holding responsible may entirely avoid these attitudes, even if one is still considering moral 
responsibility.  
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running afoul of what is expected of them. At least for many, those expectations seem so demanding 
that they lack the consistent motivation or self-control to do what they might acknowledge they 
should. As Flanagan writes in a discussion of identity and addiction,  
“Alcoholics and drug addicts often speak about no longer being themselves, of having lost 
their way, and loved ones, friends, the law, and the mental health community typically agree. 
The adult addict is physically continuous with some particular baby born years before, and 
they have an autobiographical memory of that particular individual life. Metaphysically 
speaking, the addict is the same person they always were.  But they are no longer the person 
they planned, hoped, or expected to be, or who others expected them to be. The kind of 
identity they have lost or are in danger of losing is the kind of identity that comes from 
executing authorial power to align, keep aligned, and then continually recalibrate one’s actual 
life in terms of one’s vision of the good” (Flanagan 2018: 77). 
 
One of the aims of holding addicts responsible in the context of psychotherapy, then, is to restore 
that authorial power and its connection to the addict’s identity.  
But what is it about therapeutic relationships that makes it possible for therapists to facilitate 
that restoration? More generally, what do the kind of relationships in which it makes sense to hold 
marginal agents responsible have in common? So far, I have primarily talked about parents holding 
their children responsible and therapists holding their patients responsible, but I do not mean to 
suggest that caregiving relationships are the only ones in which one could appropriately hold 
marginal agents responsible, or the only kinds of relationships that could be sources of norms. 
They are, however, paradigm instances of a broader range of close relationships. Close 
relationships are ones where the members tend to care especially about each other’s approval, and 
where the parties in question have the authority to expect each other to act in accordance with their 
values, as individuals or as members of the relationship. The importance of relationships to 
responsibility may be especially obvious when responsible agents are also impaired or immature. For 
better or for worse, children can’t raise themselves, and people with psychiatric issues who enter into 
therapy thereby acknowledge that they’d be better off not going it alone. But all of us participate in 
close relationships that are partially constituted by relationship-based norms. Consider, for example, 
 21 
the norms that people stipulate in the context of their romantic relationships about how frequently 
they communicate, or who will perform various domestic tasks, or how they will raise their children. 
That said, relationship-based norms play a more obvious role in marginal agents’ lives because some 
of the expectations that we usually hold of people may need to be adjusted in light of their deficits, 
and it is especially important for there to be a good fit between one’s responsibility responses to 
them and their capacities.19  
iii. Explaining the cases at hand 
Now, let us consider how the relationship-based norms view accounts for the three features 
of our practices of holding marginal agents responsible that I’ve discussed so far. The first such 
feature is that the content of the norms to which marginal agents are subject sometimes differs from 
the norms we generally expect psychologically normal adults to uphold. To revisit Sunday Brunch, 
though a parent might have a normative expectation that her five-year-old child not scream in a 
restaurant solely because he’s bored, she might not have a similar expectation that he shouldn’t 
scream if he burns his tongue on hot soup, whereas this is presumably something we expect of most 
adults. My explanation for this feature is as follows: Relationship-based norms aim to be sensitive to 
the capacities of the agents in those relationships, and to reflect the understanding both parties in 
the relationship have of each other. The conditions that make specific persons count as marginal 
                                                        
19 This point is nicely made with respect to children by Tamar Schapiro in her paper, “What Is a 
Child?” She argues that childhood is a normative predicament that children have to be guided out of 
in order to become autonomous, where this guidance involves sensitivity to their present capacities 
as well as acknowledgement that they will develop over time. As she writes, “Some readers have 
worried that the view I am putting forth implies that we ought to force children to take on adult 
responsibilities as early as possible, to ‘throw them in the deep end,’ as it were. But when a child (or 
any person, for that matter) is forced to perform tasks which are overly demanding given her 
abilities, this tends merely to reinforce her sense of her own dependence and powerlessness. 
Children should be given tasks which are challenging yet tractable, tasks which allow them to feel 
pleasure in their own achievement of mastery” (Schapiro 1999: 737).  
 
 22 
agents present obstacles to their meeting the demands of the moral community in those domains 
where they are impaired. Most five-year-olds, for example, find it quite difficult to control 
themselves, and the fact that they are in a public space won’t prevent them from yelping if they are 
in pain.  
That said, the content of relationship-based norms doesn’t always differ in this way. In the 
example we’ve just considered, the parent has established a norm that her five-year-old shouldn’t 
scream in the restaurant when he is bored. This may well be more difficult for a typical five-year-old 
than it would be for most adults, but it is presumably a reasonable expectation for both. Moreover, 
given the role that holding marginal agents responsible plays in their growth and development, it 
makes perfect sense that the norms they are responsible for upholding share some of their content 
with those to which psychologically normal adults are subject.  
The relationship-based norms view accounts for the second feature of our practices, namely 
that the character of our responsibility responses towards marginal agents may differ from how we 
would hold psychologically normal adults responsible, along similar lines. With both children and 
addicts, there is a recognition that the condition that makes them count as marginal agents also 
makes living up to certain expectations of the wider community especially difficult, whether due to 
emotional distress or a developing understanding of those expectations. Appropriate responsibility 
responses to these individuals take those considerations into account, and may therefore take on a 
different (e.g., less angry) tone. 
Finally, the relationship-based norms view’s explanation for the third feature of our 
practices, namely that one’s relationship to a given marginal agent matters with respect to whether or 
not it is appropriate for one to hold her responsible is, at a very general level, trivial. After all, what 
distinguishes this view from alternatives is primarily that it explains some of our responsibility 
responses in terms of norms established in the context of particular relationships. Nonetheless, it is 
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less trivial to determine which relationships are sources of norms of this kind, and when agents are 
subject to them.20 I have suggested that a special concern for the good opinion of the other party 
and a shared evaluative perspective characterize relationships that are sources of norms. 
The other views I have considered all take it for granted that there is such a thing as being a 
responsible agent, and that agents attain this status solely in light of capacities internal to them. The 
examples we have considered cast doubt on this assumption. On the pretense view, marginal agents 
lack the capacities required to be responsible, and therefore holding them responsible must be a 
matter of pretense. On the degrees of responsibility view, the fact that marginal agents have deficits 
in the capacities required for responsible agency (e.g., normative competence on Tiboris’ view) is 
what explains their diminished responsibility. On Shoemaker’s tripartite view of responsibility, 
marginal agents are likewise responsible in some senses but not others in virtue of the state of their 
internal capacities (specifically, their capacities for having and expressing a deep self, their ability to 
answer for their actions, and their regard for others). On all these views, moreover, the justification 
for holding someone responsible is tied to these capacities. 
The relationship-based norms view offers an alternative conception of responsibility. On 
this view, whether one counts as responsible, and whether someone is entitled to hold one 
responsible, is a relational matter all the way down. In order to act according to norms, agents must 
have certain capacities, but which capacities these are will depend on the norms in question. The 
norms themselves, however, are what is most fundamental to responsibility. The capacities of 
individual agents are relevant to responsibility to some extent, but their relevance is always mediated 
by social considerations. For example, the child is responsible to his parent for not screaming in the 
                                                        
20 This uncertainty about whether or not a relationship-based norm holds between particular parties 
could serve as an alternative explanation for what Shoemaker calls our ambivalence with respect to 
the responsibility of marginal agents that does not require his three senses of responsibility. 
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restaurant, and the parent is entitled to hold her child responsible for this, because of a norm that 
holds between them, and not simply because of the child’s ability to do what that norm requires. In 
this example, the child is responsible full stop – not pretend-responsible, or responsible to a degree. 
Similarly, I may be responsible to my partner, and he may be entitled to hold me responsible, for 
communicating every day when one of us is traveling, if there is a norm like this between us. Our 
relationships are foundational to responsibility, not only in bringing us up in the moral community, 
but in continuing to be sources of norms throughout our lives; we cannot be responsible by 
ourselves. 
4. Conclusion 
Friendships (as well as parent-child relationships, romantic relationships, and so on) vary 
quite a bit from each other, and therefore relationship-based norms take on a variety of different 
forms. At the most general level, these norms seem to fulfill two roles: First, relationship-based 
norms allow the parties in a particular relationship to establish how they want to be with each other. 
In this role, relationship-based norms concern matters that are strictly internal to a particular 
relationship (e.g., who takes out the trash). Many of these matters are quite mundane, although they 
can also be weightier (e.g., establishing what fidelity requires for you and your romantic partner). 
Regardless, establishing norms that are appropriate for a particular relationship partially constitutes 
the relationship itself.  
Second, relationship-based norms sometimes concern matters in the wider community, 
where the relationship is such that the parties can motivate each other to act and feel in certain ways 
in response to each other’s expectations. Relationship-based norms that play this second role also 
apply to marginal and non-marginal agents alike. Sometimes these norms arise because agents are 
impaired or immature, and sometimes they simply reflect the authority that our kith and kin have to 
hold us accountable for acting in accordance with our values. For example, if I tell a friend that I 
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intend to be an ethical vegetarian from now on, she has grounds to hold me responsible if she finds 
me eating meat that strangers or acquaintances would presumably lack.21 
The claim that marginal agents, including children, are subject to relationship-based norms in 
domains where they are impaired or still developing suggests a way of understanding the apparent 
plausibility of the degrees of responsibility view. On my view, our responsibility responses to 
marginal agents are modified in ways that reflect the difficulties they face in living up to some of the 
demands of the moral community. Rather than concluding on this basis that marginal agents are 
responsible, but to a lesser degree, I’ve invited us to notice that there are particular relationships in 
which marginal agents rely on others to help them navigate and resolve these difficulties. In the 
context of these relationships, I have argued, marginal agents are appropriately held responsible. 
Still, one might wonder where this leaves us with respect to the question of whether and to 
what extent marginal agents genuinely are responsible. After all, I haven’t denied that marginal 
agents have genuine deficits that, at least for the time being, affect what they are capable of and the 
expectations to which they are reasonably subject. Why should we think of my view, that stresses the 
importance of relationships, as a competitor to the degrees of responsibility view rather than a 
variation of it? I am not fundamentally objecting to the claim that there are degrees of responsibility 
(or indeed, that there can be pretense in our responsibility practices). I am objecting to these views 
as explanations for how we hold marginal agents responsible in ordinary life. I have tried to show 
that these practices put pressure on any view of responsibility that characterizes it as a property of 
individual agents, possessed in virtue of capacities such as rationality and self-control.  
                                                        
21 It might be the case that strangers or acquaintances would have some grounds to hold me 
responsible for eating meat if it is morally obligatory for me to abstain from doing so. However, 
these are not the same grounds that my friend has on the basis of my telling her about my ethical 
commitment. 
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For marginal and paradigm responsible agents alike, on my view, responsibility is always 
responsibility to someone. As such, the deficits that marginal agents have do not thereby mean they 
are responsible to a lesser degree, or only pretend-responsible. Another way to put what I am saying 
here, then, is that if we make being responsible a function of the psychological capacities of 
individual agents, we are forced to consider impaired and immature agents marginal. But we do not 
(or at least should not) treat them as marginal in our responsibility practices. For this reason, we 
ought to understand responsibility in relational terms.  
I have suggested that to be responsible in some domain is to be subject to norms in that 
domain, and marginal agents are clearly subject to norms. The child in Sunday Brunch is responsible 
for not yelling in the restaurant when he’s bored, and that is because he is subject to a relationship-
based norm with his parent that establishes that expectation for him. Similarly, the alcoholic in 
Noon Somewhere is responsible for showing up to therapy sober because of a relationship-based 
norm with his therapist. Paradigm responsible agents are likewise subject to relationship-based 
norms in some of their relationships.  
Admittedly, there remain questions about what precisely is involved in being subject to a 
relationship-based norm, and to what extent those norms are continuous with other kinds of norms 
and obligations.22 But we can see how responsibility theorists must address these sorts of questions 
about the relational features of responsibility in order to fully understand our social practices of 
holding people responsible. Careful attention to these practices brings the notion of having 
responsibilities to other people closer to the notion of being responsible than existing accounts of 
responsibility typically have. We can be responsible in virtue of expectations that are established in 
                                                        
22 By saying that responsibility is always responsibility to someone, I am not committing myself to 
the view that all norms to which agents are subject are relationship-based norms. I agree with 
Wallace (2011), for example, that “[m]oral requirements may be understood as relationship-
constituting, but they are not relationship-based” (Wallace 2011: 363, emphasis in original). 
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the context of specific relationships or communities, as is evidenced by the cases involving marginal 
agents I’ve discussed.  
I began by noting that much of the philosophical literature about responsibility addresses the 
question of what it takes for an agent to be responsible. I have argued that we should instead be 
asking what it takes for an agent to be responsible to someone for something. If we address 
questions about relational phenomena solely by considering individuals, we will arrive at answers 
that are incomplete at best. Attempting to understand being responsible as something we are by 
ourselves limits and thereby distorts our understanding of who is capable of responsible agency. 
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